. I am grateful to Richard Arnott, Clifford Winston and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
1. Introduction Kraus (2003) considered the second-best policy problem that arises when auto travel is priced below its marginal cost and there is a substitute mass transit mode. The present paper revisits the problem, obtaining much stronger results in a richer model. The new results have a direct application to road pricing.
As in Kraus (2003) , the focus is on the relationship between first-and second-best levels of transit service. The earlier paper established that the second-best level is higher, but only as a local result that does not necessarily hold away from the first-best optimum. The present paper extends this to a global result that applies to discretely underpriced auto travel. The fact that the result is global is what makes the road pricing application possible.
The models of the two papers differ only slightly, but the slight change in specification makes for a much richer model. In the 2003 paper, the only externalities imposed by auto commuters are congestion externalities, and the bottleneck model used to model them gives rise to a first-best auto toll that rises linearly over the morning commuting period, with the toll being zero at the beginning of the period. If there is a shift from first-best tolling to a no-tolling regime, then inefficient queuing is introduced, driving up the marginal cost of an auto trip for the same number of auto commuters. While having this direct marginal cost effect, there is no direct price effect, since equilibrium trip price for the same number of auto commuters is unchanged. In the present paper, I assume that an auto commuter not only imposes a congestion externality, but also an exogenously-given environmental externality. The first-best auto toll now increases off of an initial level determined by the environmental externality, and when there is a shift from first-best tolling to a no-tolling regime, there is both a direct marginal cost effect and a direct price effect, which is much more realistic than having only a direct marginal cost effect.
The application of the analysis to road pricing is one of road pricing accompanied by efficient pricing and service provision in transit. It is assumed that there is initially no road pricing, resulting in a below-marginal-cost price for the auto mode. There is a substitute mass transit mode for which pricing and service provision are second best. This calls for below-marginal-cost pricing in transit. Then road pricing is introduced, establishing a marginal-cost price for the auto mode. This is accompanied by reoptimization of both transit pricing and service, and a marginal-cost price is established for the transit mode. For analytical purposes, I consider this regime shift as a two-step process, the first of which is the pricing of the environmental externality through the introduction of a uniform toll. The second step is a shift from this uniform toll to the optimal timevarying toll. The first step involves a direct price increase for the auto mode, making a fare increase optimal to resolve the trading off of deadweight losses for the two modes. Not only does auto traffic decrease, but also transit ridership. As a result, transit service decreases. The second step is the peak-load pricing effect and involves a direct marginal cost reduction for the auto mode.
This amounts to an increase in the efficiency of the auto mode relative to transit, making it optimal for auto use to increase and transit use to decrease. The transit policy that is called for is a further fare increase along with a further reduction in service.
A considerable literature has grown up on the second-best policy implications of having auto travel priced at less than marginal cost. Within this literature, there are two sets of papers closely related to the present one. The larger set of papers focuses on second-best pricing of a substitute mode or road and includes early contributions by Lévy-Lambert (1968) , Marchand (1968) and Sherman (1971) , and more recent ones by Braid (1996) , Liu and McDonald (1998) , Small and Yan (2001) , Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996) and Verhoef and Small (2004) . Papers in this set take the level of transit service as exogonous. In the second set of papers (Ahn (2009) , Pels and Verhoef (2007) ), transit service is endogenous and is optimized along with the fare. In that respect, these papers are like the present one. They differ from the present paper in that the results they present are obtained through simulation (the results presented here are obtained analytically) and the models used are not peak-load pricing models (which the model of the present paper is). A simulation study that does take into account peak-load pricing is Winston and Shirley (1998) . It differs from the other papers in that the base equilibrium that it uses as a reference point is not the second-best optimum.
The next section presents the model, while the analysis is presented in Sections 3 and 4.
Section 5 provides the application to road pricing, while Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Consider two points, A and B, where individuals, who are assumed to be identical, respectively live and work. A and B are connected by a highway as well as by a rail line.
Individuals have a common work start time € t * , by which time they must be at work (arriving late is prohibitively costly). An individual who arrives at work at time
, where β > 0 is a given schedule delay cost parameter.
Highway Submodel 1
The highway submodel is a bottleneck model of the type studied by Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1993) . The highway is assumed to be uncongested, except at a single bottleneck. The bottleneck's capacity -the maximum rate at which cars can pass through the bottleneck per houris exogenous and denoted by s. An arrival rate at the bottleneck exceeding s causes a queue to form. Queuing time costs at the bottleneck are an auto commuter's only travel costs.
We will see shortly how the bottleneck's limited capacity gives rise to the imposition of congestion externalities on the part of auto commuters. In addition, each auto commuter is assumed to impose an exogenous environmental externality of
For any given number of auto commuters, 
results in decentralization of the optimal departure pattern. Once the specification of the model is complete, we will see that the optimal value of
With a starting point of (1) with € ϕ 1 optimized, we wish to consider a shift to the no-toll case of τ(t) = 0 for all € t ≤ t * . We assume that an individual has a constant cost per unit of time spent queuing of α and that € α > β. We also introduce a pair of parameters γ and λ, each taking on a value in 1] , and consider the following generalization of (1):
When γ and λ are both zero, (2) reduces to (1) . The optimal value of ,1) generates the no-toll case. Our focus will therefore be on a shift in ,1) . We will identify the separate effects of the toll level and peak-load pricing by considering a two-part shift in which
is used as an intermediate point.
For any positive value of λ, equilibrium in departures requires a certain amount of queuing, and as λ increases, queuing becomes more pronounced. A fuller treatment, along with a derivation of the aggregate time cost of auto commuters, is given in Kraus (2003) . Adding the environmental cost, the total resource cost of auto trips is given by
where
It is easily checked that Γ (⋅) is a monotonically increasing function, and that € Γ (0) = 1. Also, the equilibrium price of an auto trip is given by
Mass Transit Submodel
The mass transit submodel is identical to that in Kraus (2003) , where it is presented in detail.
The following is a summary.
A transit commuter has no travel costs except possibly for a waiting time cost at the origin train stop. In addition:
N 2 is the number of transit passengers, while R is the number of train departures (runs) from A.
σ passengers is the capacity of a run. σ and R must satisfy
At the optimum,
K is the number of physically distinct trains used to make the runs.
T is the time it takes for a train to make a roundtrip from A to B. The successive runs of a train unit must therefore be scheduled at least T minutes apart. There is also a safe headway constraint: successive train departures from A must be at least δ minutes apart.
The cost of providing transit service is given by
where € ν o ,ν 1 ,...,ν 4 are given parameters. The first term in (6) is the operating costs of runs. Since a train requires a driver regardless of its capacity, operating costs have a component that is independent of σ. The second term in (6), which we refer to as fleet costs, gives the nonoperating capital costs for the transit authority's fleet of cars. The final two terms are respectively capital costs for terminals (at A and B) and right-of-way and construction costs for trackage. Trackage costs are proportional to the distance between A and B and therefore to T.
Given N 2 , cost minimization involves a pattern of commuter arrivals at the origin stop in which a mass of passengers of size σ arrives at each of the train departure times. That way, there is no waiting. Optimal scheduling, in turn, involves running trains in clusters, with runs within a cluster separated by δ, and clusters separated by T. Letting SDC denote the aggregate schedule delay costs of transit commuters under the optimal schedule, SDC is given by
The remaining problem is to optimize R and K. Using 
is total cost for the transit mode.
For later use, we will need to know how the solution to (8) varies with N 2 . Our results are stated in the following lemma from Kraus (2003) , in which E K :N 2 denotes the elasticity of K with respect to N 2 , and corresponding notation is used for other elasticities.
Lemma 1. The following are properties of a solution to (8):
Another property we will need is that (8) gives rise to a declining long run marginal cost curve for transit trips. The reason is having a fixed cost of runs in (6) € (ν o > 0). The long run cost function for transit trips is given by the value function for (8) or
give the optimal values of R and K in terms of
It is straightforward to use the first-order conditions for (8) to show that the slope of the long run marginal cost curve,
which follows from the presence of € N 2 2 in the denominator of (10) and that as N 2 increases, R in the numerator decreases relative to € N 2 (Thus, (10) decreases at least as rapidly as
Remark. It is easily shown that the model gives rise to scale economies in providing transit trips (declining long run average cost curve for transit trips). This is partly accounted for by the fixed cost of runs, and partly by trackage costs. To see this, suppose there is a doubling in € N 2 , and that the transit authority responds by doubling σ, leaving R and K unchanged. From (7), aggregate schedule delay costs would double. In (6), the transit authority's fleet and terminals costs would double (second and third terms, respectively), as would its variable costs of runs (costs of runs dependent on σ. But its fixed costs of runs and tracking costs would remain unchanged, resulting in a less than doubling in the transit mode's total cost. 2 For decentralization of the optimum, the higher schedule delay costs associated with earlier runs must be offset by lower fares. The equilibrium price of a transit trip can be written
where ϕ 2 and L are respectively the fare for the earliest run and the number of minutes before € t * that the earliest run is scheduled. With optimal scheduling,
and (12) becomes
Demand and Overall Equilibrium
We employ the simplest possible demand specification, taking modal trip demands to be those of a representative utility-maximizing consumer. We also assume that trip demands are independent of income. Under this assumption, ordinary demand functions are identical to compensated demand functions and can be written
The fact that (15)- (16) gives compensated demands means that its price derivatives give own-and cross-substitution effects. We therefore employ the notation (15)- (16) and the two supply relationships (5) and (14). A solution takes the form
Note that the system consisting of (5) and (14)- (16) 
First-and Second-Best Problems
The problem we consider is social surplus maximization. Benefits are given by the line
while costs are given by (3) for auto trips, and by (9) for transit. Under our assumption that trip demands are independent of income, (19) is not only path-independent, but also has the property that the marginal benefit of a mode i trip is equal to its demand price.
, we write social surplus as
where the cost functions C and Φ come from (3) and (9). (20) is maximized in both first-and second-best problems, albeit for different € (γ, λ) combinations.
First-Best Problem
In the first-best problem, (20) 
for the transit cost minimization problem (8). For a demonstration, see Kraus (2003) .
From the first of the marginal cost pricing conditions, it is easy to derive
Using this in (3) gives
The result € ϕ 1 = θ then follows from using € γ = 0 in (5) and equating to (22).
The first-best highway toll is thus given by (2) with
the environmental externality, while its slope of β internalizes congestion externalities. To see the latter, note that if a marginal auto commuter is added at some time t in the first-best departure interval, then some other auto commuter must be relocated from t to the beginning of the departure interval at € t o . The congestion externality imposed by the marginal auto commuter is the increase in schedule delay cost for the relocated individual, which is β (t − t o ).
€ ϕ 2 , the fare for the earliest transit run, is also positive. The explanation for this result, which is derived in Kraus (2003) , is twofold. First, a transit passenger who is relocated from the earliest departure time to a new earlier time (to make room for a marginal passenger at her initial departure time) has her schedule delay cost increased discretely. Second, a new run would have to be added, resulting in higher operating costs for the transit authority.
Second-Best Problem
We now turn to what we will refer to as the general second-best € (γ, λ) problem: Given a € (γ, λ) combination such that either γ or λ (or both) is positive (neither parameter can take on a value greater than unity), and with € ϕ 1 constrained to equal € θ, (20) is maximized with respect to € ϕ 2 , R and K. After rearranging terms, the first-order condition for € ϕ 2 can be written
In (23),
This follows from (5) Despite the fact that pricing is no longer first-best, there is no distortion away from cost minimization in transit, and the first-order conditions for R and K again reduce to (21). The demonstration follows Kraus (2003) . The same result was obtained in previous analyses of the problem by Henderson (1985) and Arnott and Yan (2000) and depends crucially on the two modes having noninterdependent costs.
First-Best versus the No-Toll Case
The best way to understand road pricing (a regime shift from 
and
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Kraus (2003) , it was shown that under the same elasticity condition that appears in Proposition 1, the effects indicated in (24) and (25) hold locally at the first-best optimum -that is,
for an infinitesimal increase in this has the effect of making the mode 1 deadweight loss larger. As long as the own-price elasticity of transit demand is not too great, the first effect dominates the second, and a reduction in
The policy effects in (25) are easily understood in light of the price-quantity effects in (24).
The key is that the second best involves no distortion away from cost minimization in transit.
This means that transit service always accords to (8) and that Lemma 1 applies. Hence the results for R, K and σ. Lemma 1 also implies that R goes through a larger percentage increase than K, which makes the mode 2 departure interval longer (equation (13)). Thus the only way to effect a reduction in € P 2 is to lower € ϕ 2 (equation (12)). We proceed by introducing a perturbation in γ into the seven-equation system of supply and demand functions and optimal policy conditions given by (5), (14)- (16), (23) and (21) 
where H is the expression
It is at this point that we use the asymptotic property of (26) and (27) are both positive. This is the basis of: 1, 1 ) . Then up to an approximation that ignores nonlinearities in demand, the following effects hold asymptotically for large
Proof. Having established that N 1 and N 2 increase, the price effects indicated in (29) Remark. Proposition 2 can be thought of as a result that applies to large cities. Because they offer the potential for large welfare gains from road pricing, it is large cities that are of greatest interest. Nothing in the proposition requires that N 2 is large relative to , enhancing the applicability of the proposition. 
Proposition 3 is best understood as follows. Starting from the first-best, first consider an increase in € λ from 0 to 1. This eliminates peak-load pricing of the highway, causing queuing to occur at the bottleneck. The highway becomes a less efficient facility, and the marginal cost of an auto trip now exceeds its price. This is the result of a direct marginal cost effect. There is no direct price effect, since queuing substitutes for peak-load pricing. The result is that a deadweight loss is introduced for the highway. In order to reduce it, the transit fare is decreased.
Holding the value of € λ fixed at 1, now consider an increase in € γ from 0 to 1. This amounts to a shift to a no-toll regime from one that tolls uniformly at the first-best level € θ. The gap between the price and marginal cost of an auto trip becomes larger, this time as a result of a direct price effect. This increases the deadweight loss for the highway, and in order to reduce it, the transit fare is decreased further.
Road Pricing
Road pricing is a regime shift from Overall, N 2 and transit service decrease; the effect on € N 1 is ambiguous.
Conclusion
This paper has considered the second-best policy problem that arises when auto travel is underpriced and there is a substitute mass transit mode. By obtaining global results (relative to the first best) in a model in which both transit pricing and service provision are endogenous, the paper has been able to go considerably farther with this problem than have previous attempts to treat it analytically. The main policy application of the paper is to the introduction of an optimal road pricing scheme. Initially, it is assumed that there is no road pricing and that transit pricing and service provision are second best. Then road pricing is introduced and, along with it, transit pricing and service provision are reoptimized. The transit policy adjustments that are called for are an increase in the fare and a reduction in service. What drives these results is that the initial second best is characterized by below-marginal-cost pricing in transit, and once road pricing is introduced, the efficiency rationale for this is eliminated.
I conclude with a couple of comments about the road pricing application. First, there is nothing inconsistent about this paper's finding that a move from second to first best entails a reduction in transit service and the policy that London followed of increasing transit service when it introduced road pricing in 2003 (Leape (2006) ). The reason is that in London there was no change in the level of transit fares. In contrast, this paper's results apply when the transit fare is unconstrained and is reoptimized with the introduction of road pricing so that the maximum efficiency gain from road pricing is realized. Second, there is evidence that the below-marginalcost price of transit in the base equilibrium off of which road pricing is introduced in this paper and which is so crucial to the analysis is also a characteristic of real-world urban areas. The evidence comes from a recent empirical analysis by Parry and Small (2009) , who did price/marginal cost comparisons for transit operations in Washington, DC, Los Angeles and London. Price was found to be below marginal cost in all cases.
Proof of Proposition 1. It will be assumed throughout that
Lemma 2 of Kraus (2003) 
